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Daniel Gros 
7 December 2010 
he eurozone is being thrown into turmoil by a collective rush to the exits by investors. Yields 
on government debt of peripheral eurozone countries are skyrocketing, because investors do 
not really know what the risks are. 
Officials want to be reassuring. Investors should not worry, they argue, because the current bailout 
mechanism – the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) – has worked so far without any 
haircuts for bondholders, and will continue to be applied until about 2013. Only after that date 
would any new mechanism open the door for losses for private investors, and only for debt issued 
after that date. 
But markets do not trust this message – and for good reason: it is not credible, because it makes no 
economic sense. After all, the claim that the risk of loss will arise only for debt issued after the new 
crisis-resolution mechanism starts in 2014 implies that all debt issued until then is safe, and that 
insolvency can occur only in some distant future, rather than now, as in Greece and Ireland. In 
effect, EU officials are saying to investors, “Whom do you believe – us or your own eyes?” 
Moreover, for too many investors, Portugal, with its poor growth prospects and insufficient 
domestic savings to fund the public-sector deficit, looks like Greece. And Spain clearly has to 
grapple with its own Irish problem, namely a huge housing over-hang – and probably large losses in 
the banking sector – following the collapse of an outsized real-estate bubble. The problems of 
Portugal and Spain might be less severe than those of Greece and Ireland, but this apparently is not 
enough to induce investors to buy their government debt. 
A risk these countries share is thus the acute danger of large-scale runs on their banking systems. So 
far, investors trying to exit first have been made whole. Holders of Greek debt maturing now are 
repaid courtesy of the €110 billion bailout programme, and holders of Irish bank bonds have been 
given a guarantee by the Irish government, whose promises have in turn been underwritten by the 
EFSF. The EFSF will also provide funds to ensure that Irish banks’ depositors can get their money 
back today. 
The problem with this approach is that it creates the wrong incentives. Investors have now learned 
that the first to sell will avoid losses. The situation resembles that of a crowded cinema with only 
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one exit. Everyone knows that in case of fire, only the first to leave will be safe. So, if the exit is 
small, even the faintest whiff of smoke can trigger a stampede. But if the exit looks comfortably 
large, the public will be much more likely to remain calm, even if parts of the room are already 
filling with smoke. 
For the financial market, the size of the exit depends on the funds available to make short-term 
investors whole. Unfortunately, the size of the EFSF looks inadequate to finance a collective exit by 
short-term investors. 
When the EFSF was created, it was assumed that the only problem was to ensure financing for the 
government deficits of the four prospective problem countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and 
Spain). From this perspective, the headline figure of €750 billion allocated to the EFSF looked 
adequate. 
But the EFSF’s founders did not take into account banks’ enormous short-term liabilities, which in 
a crisis effectively become government debt, as Ireland has been the most recent to demonstrate. 
The EFSF might be just enough to guarantee the public debt of the four problem countries, but 
certainly not their banking sectors’ liabilities as well. 
For example, the Spanish banking sector alone has short-term liabilities of several hundred billion 
euros. To return to the cinema analogy: investors know that the exit is not large enough to allow 
them all to squeeze through at the same time. So each one wants to be among the first to get out. 
The official line so far has been “no default”, meaning no sovereign default or that of any bank can 
be considered. If this line is to be maintained, the exit door must immediately be made much wider, 
and huge fire extinguishers must be brandished. The International Monetary Fund and the European 
Central Bank must show investors that they have enough funding to finance the simultaneous exit 
of all short-term investors. 
It could work. A show of overwhelming force might restore calm to the markets. But it is a risky 
proposition: if investors exit nonetheless, the required funds might be so large that creditor 
countries’ taxpayers’ revolt. 
The alternative is to change strategy and focus instead on investors’ incentives. Patient investors 
should be rewarded. In particular, they should be able to expect to be better off than those rushing to 
the exit. This approach depends on two major policy shifts. 
First, governments should not be pushed into insolvency just to save all banks. This means that the 
Irish government (maybe the next one) should demand that holders of bank bonds share the losses, 
perhaps by offering them a simple debt-equity swap. 
Doubts about the Irish government’s solvency would then disappear quickly, and its guarantee of 
bank deposits would no longer look so shaky. Something similar might have to be done for the 
Spanish banking system’s exposure to the local housing market. 
The second component of a permanent anti-crisis mechanism is a floor for bond prices – and thus a 
ceiling for losses. The yields and volatility of longer-term bonds should then fall relative to short-
term securities, allowing peripheral governments to finance themselves reliably and at reasonable 
cost. 
None of this would resolve Europe’s fundamental problems, namely weak fiscal positions, poorly 
functioning financial sectors and lack of competitiveness. But all of them would be easier to 
manage with calmer financial markets. 